Van Sher v. Uppermoreland Township School by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-2-2012 
Van Sher v. Uppermoreland Township School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Van Sher v. Uppermoreland Township School" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 1043. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/1043 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1 
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-3526 
 ___________ 
 
 VAN C. SHER; CAROL L. SHER, ON BEHALF 
OF THEMSELVES AND THEIR SON, ALS, 
        Appellants 
 v. 
 
 UPPER MORELAND TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT; 
ROBERT MILROD; HOWARD COHEN 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-01525) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Robert F. Kelly 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 4, 2012 
Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES AND WEIS, Circuit 
 
Judges 
 (Opinion filed: May 2, 2012 ) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Van and Carol Sher, proceeding pro se, appeal from the District Court’s order 
dismissing their complaint under, inter alia, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
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(“§ 504”), 29 U.S.C. § 794.1
I. 
  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District 
Court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings. 
 The Shers are the grandparents and legal guardians of A.L.S., a minor with 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”).  A.L.S. entered the Upper Moreland 
School District (“the District”) in the eighth grade, in 2007, and began having behavioral 
problems.  Although the District evaluated A.L.S. for ADHD in January 2008, he was not 
properly diagnosed as having ADHD until around September 2009.  At that point, the 
District instituted a plan under § 504 to accommodate A.L.S.’s disability.  Ultimately, the 
plan was unsuccessful, and the Shers withdrew A.L.S. from the school district. 
 The Shers then filed a complaint with the Pennsylvania Department of Education, 
alleging multiple violations of § 504 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Improvement Act of 2004 (“the IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et. seq.  In particular, the 
Shers alleged that the District failed to provide A.L.S. a Free Appropriate Public 
Education (“FAPE”), as required by § 504 and the IDEA, and sought compensatory 
education, reimbursement for educational expenses, such as S.A.T. preparation classes, 
and compensatory damages for future psychological care.  Following three days of 
                                                 
1  The Shers’ complaint and this appeal were also taken on behalf of their minor 
grandson, for whom they have parental rights.  Because the Shers are non-lawyers 
proceeding pro se, however, they are not permitted to represent their grandson’s 
interests in federal court.  See Osei-Afriye v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 937 F.2d 876, 882 (3d 
Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, this appeal proceeds only as to the grandparents, and any 
reference to “the Shers” in this opinion is made without regard to the grandson. 
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hearings late in 2010, the Hearing Officer concluded that A.L.S. was ineligible for 
protection under the IDEA, but that he was protected under § 504.  The Hearing Officer 
further determined that, by failing to diagnose A.L.S.’s ADHD in a reasonable time, the 
District failed to provide A.L.S. a FAPE for a 45-week period, thereby committing a 
substantive violation of § 504.  However, the Hearing Officer concluded that A.L.S. was 
not entitled to the remedy of compensatory education because his academic progress 
during the 45-week period was adequate.  In addition, the Hearing Officer held that the 
Shers were not entitled to any reimbursement because they had not submitted evidence of 
education-related expenditures. 
 In early 2011, the Shers filed the instant complaint in the Court of Common Pleas, 
Montgomery County, alleging violations of § 504, as well as violations of A.L.S.’s rights 
under the United States Constitution and Pennsylvania law.  The Shers sought several 
different forms of injunctive relief, as well as $5 million in compensatory damages.  The 
District removed the case to the District Court, which granted the District’s motion to 
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  In particular, the District Court 
reasoned that, with respect to their claims stemming from the District’s failure to provide 
A.L.S. a FAPE, the Shers had not properly exhausted those claims through the state 
administrative remedy system, thus barring relief in court.  In dismissing the complaint, 
the District Court also denied the Shers’ motion for appointment of counsel to represent 
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them and A.L.S.  The Shers now appeal the District Court’s decision.2
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(a).  
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision to dismiss the Shers’ complaint.  See 
Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2010).  “In deciding a motion to 
dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and 
interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and all inferences must be drawn 
in favor of them.”  McTernan v. City of York
 In dismissing the Shers’ claims predicated on the District’s failure to provide 
A.L.S. a FAPE, the District Court reasoned that the Shers had failed to exhaust their 
claims through the state administrative remedy system.  We agree with the District Court 
that, to the extent that the Shers sought relief under § 504 for the failure to provide a 
FAPE, the requirements of § 504, and any remedies available under that law, were 
coextensive with the IDEA.  
, 577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted).  
See
                                                 
2  In their brief, the Shers contest the District Court’s decision only insofar as it 
dismissed their § 504 claims against the District.  Accordingly, they have waived any 
other arguments that the District Court erred in dismissing their complaint.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 
275, 398 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.33(b)(1) and 104.36.  Under the 
IDEA, a complainant must pursue relief from local and/or state educational authorities 
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before seeking relief in court.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f), (g), and (i)(2).  The IDEA allows 
each state to prescribe whether its administrative hearing system is comprised of one or 
two tiers.  See § 1415(f) and (g).  Pennsylvania has a one-tier system:  after an impartial 
due process hearing at the local level, an aggrieved party may seek relief in court.  See
 We also question the District Court’s dismissal of the Shers’ § 504 discrimination 
claim on the ground that the Shers claimed that they were not appealing the Hearing 
Officer’s determination.  A liberal construction of the Shers’ pro se filings leads us to 
conclude that the Shers’ seemingly sweeping assertion that they do not seek to challenge 
the Hearing Officer’s determination is limited to their approval of the determination that 
A.L.S. was denied a FAPE.  It defies logic that the Shers would file a complaint alleging 
discrimination without implicitly challenging the Hearing Officer’s determination that 
A.L.S. was not the victim of discrimination. 
 22 
Pa. Code. § 14.162(o) (2008).  In concluding that the Shers failed to exhaust, the District 
Court improperly relied on the pre-2008 version of § 14.162, which prescribed a two-tier 
system.  As the Shers argue, and as the District concedes, the District Court applied an 
outdated framework, and the Shers adequately exhausted their FAPE-based § 504 claims 
through the state administrative remedy system before filing their complaint. 
 Further, in dismissing the § 504 discrimination claim, the District Court appears to 
have included an alternative holding that the Shers’ claim must fail because § 504 does 
not prohibit a school district from disciplining a disabled child.  See generally Honig v. 
Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325-26 (1988).  Although we agree that § 504 surely does not 
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altogether preclude such discipline, that does not mean that no cause of action will lie for 
improperly discriminatory discipline.  See Thompson v. Bd. of Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
144 F.3d 574, 580 (8th Cir. 1998).  And it is at least plausible that compensatory damages 
could be available for such a violation.  See, e.g., Meagley v. City of Little Rock
 Finally, we note that because the District Court’s denial of the Shers’ counsel 
motion rested on its incorrect reasoning for dismissing their complaint, the District Court 
will wish, on remand, to revisit the Shers’ request for appointment of counsel.  In 
addition, the District Court should consider:  (1) whether the Shers, as A.L.S.’s 
guardians, have standing to assert a discrimination claim in their own right under § 504, 
and (2) what effect, if any, A.L.S.’s apparent withdrawal from the school district has on 
his right and the Shers’ right to pursue relief for a FAPE violation under § 504.  
, 639 
F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) (“All circuits to decide the question have held that to 
recover compensatory damages under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a 
plaintiff must establish that the agency’s discrimination was intentional.”). 
See 20 
U.S.C. § 1415(j) (stating that “unless the . . . local educational agency and the parents 
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the 
child . . . until all [] proceedings [under the IDEA and § 504] have been completed”); 
C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist.
 Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further 
proceedings. 
, 606 F.3d 59, 71-72 (3d Cir. 2010). 
